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Abstract
This paper evaluates the welfare gains arising from a deeper trade integration in the European
Monetary Union. To do this, the European Monetary Union is represented in a realistic way
by an intertemporal general equilibrium model with incomplete nancial markets, sticky
prices and home bias both in private consumption and production. The model is estimated
and globally not rejected by the data. Two main results emerge : (i) an increase in vertical
(intermediate goods) trade implies welfare gains while (ii) an increase in horizontal trade
implies welfare losses.
Keywords: trade integration, ination di¤erentials, welfare analysis, optimal currency areas.
J.E.L. Classication: F32, F41, F47.
1 Introduction
This article investigates the welfare e¤ects of a deeper horizontal or vertical trade
integration in the European Monetary Union (EMU). Independently of its long-run
consequences, welfare gains of trade integration usually rest upon the increased corre-
lation of business cycles and the improved overall adequacy of the common monetary
? We would like to thank James Anderson, as well as participants of the ESEM in Budapest,
the RIEF Meeting in Rome, and the 24th Symposium in Money, Banking and Finance in
Rennes for helpful comments. The traditional disclaimer applies. Corresponding author. Email: stephane.auray@univ-lille3.fr
policy to national situations. This paper shows that the impact of trade integration is
more contrasted when assuming that nancial markets are incomplete and imperfectly
integrated.
We lay out an estimated two-country DSGE model of the European Monetary Union
(EMU) that accounts for the imperfect integration of both goods and nancial markets.
As in Ricci (1997), the model encompasses real and monetary arguments for the costs
of conducting a single monetary policy in a monetary union characterized by business
cycles asymmetries and ination di¤erentials. Indeed, the model features home bias in
private consumption and production technology, incomplete and imperfectly integrated
private nancial markets, Calvo type sticky prices, and i.i.d. productivity and public
spending shocks. These assumptions are also set up to be consistent with the current
economic situation of the EMU, characterized by persistent asymmetries in business
cycles and signicant ination di¤erentials (see Camacho, Perez-Quiros and Saiz, 2006
and Lane, 2006 for discussions).
In this tractable framework, asymmetric shocks and/or shocks imply asymmetries in
business cycles and ination di¤erentials that can not be addressed by the central bank
of the monetary union. These business cycles asymmetries and ination di¤erentials
translate into welfare costs, building on two mains sources: nominal inertia and imper-
fect risk-sharing combined to a costly access to nancial markets. The role of nominal
inertia in a monetary union, as well as means to reduce the associated costs, have
already been extensively studied in the literature (see among others Bengino, 2004;
Beetsma and Jensen, 2005 and Gali and Monacelli, 2008). Less attention has been
paid to welfare losses related to imperfectly integrated nancial markets in a mone-
tary union. In line with Carré and Collard (2003), we show that imperfect risk-sharing
crucially a¤ects the welfare costs of business cycles asymmetries and the size, sign and
structure of welfare gains generated by trade integration.
First, we show that an increase of horizontal or vertical trade integration, modeled as
a reduction of home bias in consumption or in production, increases the correlation of
business cycles through an increase of mutual trade ows. The overall adequacy of the
common monetary policy to national situations is thus clearly improved. The volatility
of national ination rates decreases, which signicantly improves the aggregate welfare
in the monetary union. These results are in the spirit of those of Romer (1993), but
the mechanisms that lead to these e¤ects are di¤erent. 1
Second, vertical and horizontal trade have opposite e¤ects on the pattern of exter-
nal adjustment to asymmetric shocks. Vertical trade integration reduces the overall
need for external adjustment, i.e. the volatility of the current account while horizontal
trade increases it. Because nancial markets are incomplete and imperfectly integrated,
a higher (respectively lower) volatility of the current account increases (respectively
1 According to Romer, loose monetary policies become less appealing when openness in-
creases.
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dampens) the welfare costs related to the imperfect integration of nancial markets
and imperfect risk-sharing.
The result builds on the following mechanism. Using nancial markets (the current ac-
count) more intensively to smooth their wealth over time, households increase (respec-
tively decrease) their labor supply when contracting debts (respectively accumulating
assets) to respect their intertemporal budget constraint. Since we consider a closed
monetary union, debts contracted by the representative household of a country are
necessarily equal to the cumulated assets of the representative household of the other
country. As a result, increased movements of the current account are met by opposite
changes in labor supplies. In the equilibrium, the distance of relative hours, relative
wages and intermediate terms-of-trade to their natural equilibrium path (characterized
by complete nancial markets) increases, which generates welfare losses. The welfare
gains of vertical trade integration are consequently reinforced, while the welfare gains
of horizontal trade integration are reduced or turn into welfare losses, depending on
parameterizations.
Quantitatively speaking, we highlight that vertical trade integration leads to important
welfare gains for the whole range of possible parameters of the model. In the baseline
estimation, we show that a 10% increase 2 of vertical trade implies an average wel-
fare gain equivalent to a 12.76% rise of permanent consumption for a constant labor
e¤ort. On the other hand, horizontal trade generates lower welfare gains or welfare
losses, depending on the parametrization. In the baseline estimation, a 10% increase
of horizontal tarde implies an average welfare loss equivalent to a 2.09% drop of per-
manent consumption. A sensitivity analysis shows that horizontal trade can lead to
welfare gains, especially when the welfare costs of nominal rigidities increase or when
the welfare costs of imperfect nancial integration decrease.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a two-country
model of an imperfectly integrated monetary union. Based on EMU data, Section 3
provides estimates for the structural parameters of the loglinear approximation of
the model. The dynamics properties of the model are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5
provides an extensive welfare analysis of an increase in trade integration and presents
some sensitivity analysis. A last section o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 An imperfectly integrated monetary union
The model describes a two-country world with a common currency. Each nation repre-
sents half of this monetary union. It is populated by N innitely-living households, a
government, rms producing intermediate and nal goods, and importers assembling
2 This increase ts the actual consensus concerning the e¤ect of the EMU on intrazone trade
(see Baldwin, 2006).
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consumption goods. All goods are traded. Monetary policy is delegated to the central
bank of the monetary union which controls the interest rate. The international nancial
market is incomplete and agents only trade one-period composite bonds. 3
2.1 Households and national governments
In each country the number of innitely-living households is normalized to one. The
representative household j 2 [0; 1] of nation i 2 fh; fg maximizes a welfare index,
1X
t=0
tE0
(
Cit(j)
1 
1    
N it (j)
1+ 
1 +  
)
; (1)
subject to,
Bit+1(j) RtBit(j) =W itN it (j) + it(j)  P itCit(j)  T it (j)  Pi;tACit(j); (2)
and the following transversality condition,
lim
T!1
Ts=tR
 1
s Et
n
BiT+1(j)
o
= 0:
In Eq. (1), the subjective discount factor, , is equal to (1+) 1,  is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of private consumption and  is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity. The aggregate consumption bundle of agent (j) in country i is called Cit(j)
and the quantity of labor that this agent supplies on the labor market N it (j). Money
holdings are not introduced in the utility function since the money market plays no
role for the dynamics when the nominal interest rate is the monetary policy instrument
(see Beetsma and Jensen, 2005).
In Eq. (2), Bit(j) is the amount of one-period nominal bonds hold by the representative
agent of country i at the end of period t  1, that pays a gross nominal rate of interest
Rt between periods (t   1) and t. The consumer price index (CPI) in country i is
called P it while Pi;t corresponds to the producer price index (PPI) in country i. W
i
t
is the nominal wage in country i in period t, it(j) =
R 1
0 
i
t(k; j)dk is the amount of
prots paid by monopolistic nal goods producers, and T i(j) is a lump-sum transfer.
Finally, in the budget constraint, ACit(j) is a quadratic portfolio adjustment cost that
households have to pay to nancial intermediaries to access nancial markets. The cost
is dened according to,
ACit(j) =

2
h
Bit+1(j) Bi(j)
i2
;
3 Nominal exchange rate issues per se as well as the analysis of the conditions underlying
the adoption of a common currency are beyond the scope of the paper.
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where Bi(j) is the steady state level of net foreign assets. The Euler condition that
solves Eqs. (1)-(2) is a¤ected by portfolio adjustment costs since,
Rt+1
1 + Pi;t(Bit+1(j) Bi(j))
Et
(
P itC
i
t(j)

P it+1C
i
t+1(j)

)
= 1: (3)
The portfolio adjustment cost parameter () a¤ects the sensitivity of wealths accumu-
lation to a variation of the interest rate, as it becomes more or less costly to smooth
consumption by accessing nancial markets. For instance, when  decreases, it is less
costly for the households to access to the nancial markets. The labor supply function
is based on the traditional consumption/leisure arbitrage,
N it (j)
 Cit(j)
 =
W it
P it
: (4)
2.2 Governments
Governments choose the amount of public spending on the nal goods market and bal-
ance their budget using lump-sum transfers. The budget constraint of the government
is given by, Z 1
0
T i(j)dj + 
Z 1
0
Pi;t(k)Y
i
t (k)dk = Pi;tG
i
t;
where  is a proportional subsidy to rms. Mixing monopolistic competition and Calvo
staggered price contracts on nal goods markets introduces several distortions with
respect to the Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium. Nominal rigidities imply ine¢ cient uctu-
ations of both equilibrium ination and output while the assumption of monopolistic
competition a¤ects the steady state. While monetary and/or scal policy may address
the rst issue, an optimal subsidy  is able to address the second issue and restores the
rst-best allocation in the steady state (see Benigno and Woodford, 2005).
National public spending are entirely home biased, i.e.,
Git =
Z 1
0
Git(k)
 1
 dk
 
 1
;
where the level of aggregate public spending evolves according to,
Git+1 =

1  g

Gi + gG
i
t + 
i
g;t+1:
where  ig;t is an i.i.d. innovation.
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2.3 Firms
2.3.1 Intermediate goods producers
The production of nal goods consists in a two-step process. First, in each country i, a
continuum of identical rms (normalized to one) produce the same intermediate good
and sell it on on a competitive market. The production function of these rms is given
by,
X it = A
i
tL
i
t;
where Lit is the labor demand andA
i
t is the level of labor productivity evolving according
to,
Ait+1 = (1  a)Ai + aAit +  ia;t+1:
where  ia;t is an i.i.d. innovation.
2.3.2 Final goods producers
Second, intermediate goods are traded within the monetary union and combined by
monopolistic nal goods producers k 2 [0; 1]. Intermediate goods are sold at their
marginal cost W it =A
i
t and intermediate terms-of-trade are,
t =
W ft =A
f
t
W ht =A
h
t
:
The production function of nal goods producer k located in country i is given by,
Y it (k) =

(1  i)
1
 X ih;t(k)
 1
 + (i)
1
 X if;t(k)
 1

 
 1
: (5)
In this expression, X ih;t(k) is the consumption of intermediate goods produced in coun-
try h of rm k located in country i. The parameter (1   i) 2
h
0; 1
2
i
is the home bias
in the production of nal goods. In the production function (5),  is the elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods. The companion nominal marginal cost of
rm k in country i; MCit(k); is given by,
MCit(k) =

(1  i)

W ht =A
h
t
1 
+ (i)
1


W ft =A
f
t
1  11 
:
Final goods prices are governed by standard Calvo contracts. Each period, only a
fraction (1  i) of randomly selected rms located in country i 2 fh; fg are allowed to
set new prices. Assuming that rms do not discriminate among markets they adress,
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these rms choose the following optimal price P i;t(k);
P i;t(k) =

(   1) (1  )
1P
v=0
(i)
v
Et

Y it+v(k)MC
i
t+v
P it+vC
i
t+v(j)


1P
v=0
(i)v Et

Y it+v(k)
P it+vC
i
t+v(j)

 :
Aggregating among nal rms and assuming behavioral symmetry of monopolistic
producers, the average producer price level of nal goods in country i 2 fh; fg is,
Pi;t =
h
1  i

P i;t(k)
1  + iP 1 i;t 1
i 1
1  :
2.3.3 Importers
A continuum of importers build units of consumption goods % using domestic and
foreign nal goods according the following production function,
Zit (%) =
24(1  i) 1 Z 1
0
Zih;t(%; k)
 1
 dk
 ( 1)
( 1)
+ 
1

i
Z 1
0
Zif;t(%; k)
 1
 dk
 ( 1)
( 1)
35

 1
;
and sell them on perfectly competitive markets at the following price,
P it (%) = P
i
t =
24(1  i) 1 Z 1
0
Ph;t(k)
1 dk
 1 
1 
+ 
1

i
Z 1
0
Pf;t(k)
1 dk
 1 
1 
35 11  ;
or equivalently,
P it =

(1  i)
1
 (Ph;t)
1  + 
1

i (Pf;t)
1 
 1
1 
:
In these expressions, (1  i) 2
h
0; 1
2
i
is the home bias in the production of consumption
goods,   1 is the elasticity of substitution among national varieties and  is the
elasticity of susbtitution between domestic and foreign nal goods. Finally, we dene
nal terms-of-trade in the monetary union as,
St =
Pf;t
Ph;t
:
It has now become standard to regard home bias parameters, such as 1 i or 1 i as
a relevant measures of goods market openness. Indeed, in equilibrium, i and i are the
share of imported goods in the production of nal and consumption goods respectively
(see Corsetti, 2006 and Galí and Monacelli, 2005). In the remainder of the paper, we
thus consider i and i directly as parameters measuring horizontal and vertical trade
openness.
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2.4 Monetary policy
A common central bank controls the nominal interest rate within the monetary union,
Rt+1 = (1  r)R + rRt + ' (ut   u) ;
where ut =
1
2
ht +
1
2
ft and it = P
i
t =P
i
t 1. This rule is commonly used in the literature
(see among others Taylor, 1993; Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1998 and Rudebusch and
Svensson, 1999). Furthermore, it is a fair approximation of the monetary policy of the
European Central Bank with respect to its mission, i.e. the stabilization of aggregate
ination in the EMU. Finally, a large empirical literature highlights the smoothness of
the nominal interest rate variations in the euro area (see among others Peersman and
Smets, 1999 and Gerlach and Schnabel, 2000).
2.5 Markets equilibrium
We solve the model assuming that each country is the mirror image of the other on the
goods market. Posing h =  and h =  we simply get f = (1  ) and f = (1  ).
A competitive equilibrium is dened as a sequence of quantities,
fQtg1t=0 =
n
Cht ; C
f
t ; N
h
t ; N
f
t ; Y
h
t ; Y
f
t ; Z
h
t ; Z
f
t ; L
h
t ; L
f
t ; B
h
t+1; B
f
t+1; AC
h
t ; AC
f
t
o
,
and a sequence of prices,
fPtg1t=0 =
n
P h;t (k) ; P f;t (k) ; Ph;t; Pf;t; P
h
t ; P
f
t ;W
h
t ;W
f
t ; Rt+1
o
,
such that:
(i) For a given sequence of exogenous shocks fStg1t=0 =
n
Aht ; A
f
t ; G
h
t ; G
f
t
o
and prices
fPtg1t=0, fQtg1t=0 respects households rst order conditions and maximizes the prots
of consumption, nal and intermediate goods producers.
(ii) For a given sequence of shocks fStg1t=0 and quantities fQtg1t=0, fPtg1t=0 clears con-
sumption, nal and intermediate goods markets, labor markets,
N it =
Z 1
0
N it (j)dj = L
i
t;
and nancial markets, Z 1
0
Bht (j)dj +
Z 1
0
Bft (j)dj = 0:
In the equilibrium, net foreign assets evolve as follows,
Bht+1  Bht = (Rt   1)Bht + 

P ft C
f
t   P ht Cht

+ 

MCft Y
f
t DP
f
t  MCht Y ht DP ht

;
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where DP it is the dispersion of nal goods production prices in country i.
3 Estimation
We estimate the loglinear version of the model using the Simulated Method of Mo-
ments (SMM) of Hansen (1982). 4 In the symmetric competitive exible price steady
state, we assume that Ai = A = 1 and that  = (1  ) 1. Other steady state relations
are given by,
Y = (1  )   + ; C = (1  )   + ; G =  (1  )   + ;
N = (1  )   + ; W=P = 1 and R =  1:
We use quarterly data from EMU countries (OECD Economic Outlook quarterly data-
base) posterior to the German reunication, i.e. ranging from 1992 to 2006. Aggregates
are converted in the same currency and we focus on the following seasonally adjusted
series: GDP (without investment), private consumption, employment, GDP deator,
trade balance and current account balance (as a percentage of GDP). We also take into
account the evolution of the average nominal short-term interest rate in the EMU.
We build two regions based on the levels of nominal rigidities of EMU countries (see
Benigno, 2004). Table 1 indicates the percentage of goods prices in the consumer price
index changing every month in EMU countries (data are borrowed from Alvarez et al.,
2006). We consider that countries in which less than 15% of CPI goods prices change
every month belong to the group of high nominal rigidities and countries in which more
than 15% of CPI goods prices change every month belong to the group of low nominal
rigidities. Consequently, in the rst group (region h in the model), we have Germany,
Spain and Italy and in the second group (region f in the model), we have all remaining
countries. 5
Once both regions of the monetary union are dened, we aggregate series given the
relative time-varying weights of countries in terms of GDP in the region. Ination rates
are computed using GDP deators. Finally, we take the log of GDP, consumption and
employment and detrend all series using the HP-lter. We estimate the model using a
large sample of second order moments. We focus on three types of moment: standard
deviations (absolute or relative to standard deviation of output), rst-order autocor-
relations and cross-correlations. Standard deviations and autocorrelations concern all
4 The loglinear approximation of the model is presented in Table A.1 in the appendix.
5 Austria, Greece and Ireland are not taken into account because data are unavailable or not
reliable.
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Table 1
Nominal rigidities in the EMU
% goods in the CPI % of countrys GDP
Region changing prices every month in the EMU GDP
Germany h 13:5 29:1
France f 23:9 21:6
Italy h 10:0 17:7
Spain h 13:3 11:0
Netherlands f 16:2 6:4
Belgium f 17:6 3:7
Luxembourg f 23:0  
Finland f 20:3 2:0
Portugal f 21:1 1:8
variables and cross-correlations are those of output with private consumption, output
with hours and private consumption with hours.
Some parameters of the model are calibrated. We set  = 0:988; which corresponds to
an annual real interest rate of 4:7%, consistent with the average real interest rate over
the corresponding period in the EMU. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997),
the elasticity of substitution between varieties is  = 7; implying an average 16-17%
steady state mark-up (compensated at the equilibrium by the optimal subsidy). The
average share of public spending in the GDP is set to  = 0:25 (see Galí and Mona-
celli, 2008). The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is  = 1:5 (see
Hairault, 2002). Finally, we calibrate parameters of the nominal interest rate rule using
standard values for the smoothing parameter r = 0:7 and for the feedback coe¢ cient
on aggregate ination ' = 1:5 (see Gerlach and Schnabel, 2000).
Other parameters are estimated. The results of the estimation are reported in Table
2. The test allowed by over-identifying conditions implies a 0:8035% p-value, which
indicates that the model is not rejected by the data.
Table 2
Estimated parameters
     h f 
7.0776 1.8111 0.2675 0.0509 0.0009 0.5023 0.5024 2.9344
a g std(a;t) std(g;t) J   stat Ov: Id: Stat: p  value
0.9525 0.8862 0.0079 0.0099 10: 0875 2(16) 0:8035
: 99% signicant
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Parameter values are consistent with most estimates or calibrations reported in the
literature and are signicant. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity  is equal to 7:08 and
lies on the upper bound of the range put forth by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2006).
This value is consistent with a sluggish response of labour supply to various shocks
in the EMU. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private consumption is
 = 1:81, close to standard values (see Benigno, 2004). This parameter governs both the
intensity of the transmission of monetary policy through the sensitivity of consumption
to the real interest rate and the arbitrage between leisure and consumption. Home bias
parameters are  = 0:051 and  = 0:27 and determine the degree of trade openness
of intermediate and nal goods markets. These values are consistent with those found
in Faia (2007) and with standard openness measures calculated using EMU data. The
estimation of  = 0:0009 is not far from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). It implies
that households have to pay an average annual 0:36% interest rate premium to access
nancial markets. Nominal rigidities parameters are very close since h = 0:5024 and
f = 0:5023. Our estimation is lower than usual estimations, as in Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (1998), but matches the values put forth in Alvarez et al. (2006). Finally,
parameters governing shocksprocesses are a = 0:9525, g = 0:8862, std(a;t) = 0:79%
and std(g;t) = 0:99%. These estimations are consistent with most values found in the
RBC literature.
4 Dynamic properties
In this section we study the dynamic properties of the economy when facing asymmetric
productivity and public spending shocks.
Figure 1 plots the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) to a positive unit productivity
shock in the home country.
Output rises in both countries, while more substantially in country h; peeking at 0:7%
for a 1% productivity shock. In country h, the remaing of productivity gains is used
to reduce the labour e¤ort, about 0:25% on impact. This e¤ect arises because the
wealth e¤ect dominates in models with separable utility functions and without physical
capital. The wealth e¤ect is reinforced by the 0:17% drop of the PPI ination in the
home country.
The transmission of the shock in country f draws both on trade ows and monetary
policy. While agents in country h sustain higher production and consumption levels,
they generate intermediate and nal trade ows within the monetary union, which
induces a positive reaction of the output in country f of about 0:3% on impact. The
common monetary policy also favors a positive transmission. By reacting to aggregate
ination, the central bank lowers its equilibrium nominal interest rate, which induces
an increase of aggregate consumption and output in country f: The supply shock in
country h thus translates into a positive demand shock in country f , which generates
11
Fig. 1. IRFs to a unit productivity shock in country h
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some PPI ination, peeking at 0:12% on impact and returning quickly to the steady
state.
Since wages and production prices drop in country h and rise in country f , both
intermediate and nal terms-of-trade improve in country h. Final goods prices are
sluggish, which implies an undershooting of nal terms-of-trade with respect to the
uctuation of intermediate terms-of-trade. Finally, agents in country h accumulate net
foreign assets, implying an improvement of the current account peeking at 16-17% of
steady state consumption on impact.
Figure 2 plots the IRFs to a positive unit public spending shock in the home country.
Output increases of 0:15% on impact in country h, implying a rise of both home and
foreign labor supply, required to sustain the demanded quantity of nal goods in coun-
try h. Private consumption drops steadily in both countries. The drop attains 0:13%
in country h, because of the crowding-out e¤ect and because Ricardian equivalence
holds. The drop is more gentle in country f , reaching 0:08% on impact. Since global
demand drops in country f , output clearly falls of 0:07% on impact while returning
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Fig. 2. IRFs to a unit public spending shock in country h
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very quickly to the steady state. Mechanisms behind the negative transmission of a
public spending shocks in country h build on a traditional beggar-thy-neighbor e¤ect
and highlight the role of home bias in public spending in a rst approach. However, this
e¤ect also relies (i) on the fall of private consumption in country h, implying a drop
of country h imports from country f and (ii) on the increase of nominal interest rate
implied by the reaction of the central bank to the ination of country h. The positive
demand shock in country h thus translates into a negative demand shock in country f .
External adjustment implies a steady deterioration of nal and intermediate terms-of-
trade and an accumulation of net foreign liabilities in country h. The corresponding
decit of the current account peeks at 4:5-5% of steady state consumption on impact.
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5 The welfare gains of trade integration
In this section, we measure the welfare gains arising from a deeper horizontal of vertical
trade integration in the EMU.
5.1 Welfare indicators
We built an explicit welfare indicator on a second-order approximation of the aggregate
utility function. The welfare measure can be expressed as a discounted sum of utility
ows,
! =  q
2
1X
t=0
tE0 f`tg+ t:i:p+O
3 :
where q = (1  ) (1  ) + , t:i:p gathers terms independent of the problem and O
3
are terms of order 3 or higher. In this expression, the instant welfare contribution
`t is a quadratic function of deviations of key economic variables from their natural
equilibrium path,
`t =

2kh
(h;t   eh;t)2 + 
2kf
(f;t   ef;t)2 +  +  (1  )
(1  ) (y
u
t   eyut )2
+ (1  ) & (st   est)2 + & (t   et)2 +  (1  ) (crt   ecrt )2 +  (nrs   enrs)2 ; (6)
where ki = (
1 i)(1 i)
i
. In Eq. (6), a tilde denotes the path of variables in the natural
equilibrium, dened as the equilibrium under exible prices and complete and perfectly
integrated asset markets, i.e. h = f = 0 and  = 0. Superscripts u and r respectively
stand for aggregate and relative variables.
The welfare measure ! penalizes national PPI ination rates, the aggregate output
gap, the relative consumption gap, the relative hours gap and terms-of-trade gaps.
The weights a¤ected to national ination rates are sensitive to the degree of price
stickiness through the values of ki. Parameter ki depends negatively on the degree
of price rigidities, so that higher weights are deferred to ination rates when prices
are stickier. We compute the consumption equivalent welfare loss. As in Beetsma and
Jensen (2005), 	 is dened according to,
	 = 100 
"
(1  )
(1  ) ( +  (1  )) (!1   !0)
# 1
2
; (7)
where !0 measures the welfare for a given reference situation. 	 converts the welfare
gains associated to a pareto-superior equilibrium !1 into a sizable yardstick in terms
of permanent increase of consumption for an unchanged work e¤ort.
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5.2 Baseline scenario
Running simulations using the baseline estimation, Table 3 contrasts the welfare gains
or losses (	) arising from a deeper horizontal or vertical trade integration consistent
with the evidence documented by Baldwin (2006), i.e. a 10% increase of  or . The
table also details the evolution of the volatility of variables entering in the welfare loss
function.
Table 3
The welfare gains of a 10% deeper horizontal () or vertical () trade integration
Standard deviation (%)
	(%) bh;t bf;t byut bst bt bcrt bnrt
Baseline   0:188 0:190 0:047 0:731 1:925 1:002 0:308
 = 0:2397  1:81 0:186 0:187 0:047 0:665 1:963 1:008 0:311
V ariation(%)    1:50  1:49 0:00  9:12 1:98 0:64 1:17
 = 0:0704 13:92 0:185 0:187 0:047 0:721 1:786 0:996 0:300
V ariation(%)    1:53  1:54  0:00  1:38  7:20  0:56  2:54
Note: variables with a hat denote deviations from natural equilibrium
On one hand, a 10% increase of  generates large welfare gains, equivalent to an average
13:92% increase of permanent consumption. The overall volatility of terms entering the
loss function is clearly dampened. When vertical trade increases, the composition of
nal goods produced becomes more similar, which implies that shocks a¤ecting the
production process of intermediate goods asymmetrically have more similar e¤ects on
output and marginal costs. This mechanism also contributes to lower the PPI national
ination rates, as illustrated by the new keynesian Phillips curves. If marginal costs, the
driving force behind the PPI ination rates, are more correlated, then the PPI ination
rates are a¤ected in the same way. The adequacy of the common monetary policy to
national ination rates and business cycles increases, which improves its e¤ectiveness
and reduces the volatility of national ination rates. Finally, by the same reasoning,
the volatility of intermediate terms-of-trade, relative hours and relative consumptions
gaps is reduced, which translates into aggregate welfare gains.
On the other hand, in the baseline scenario, a 10% increase of horizontal trade 
measured by a 10% increase of , implies an average welfare loss equivalent to a 1:81%
fall of permanent consumption.
A close examination of volatilities shows that the distance of national ination rates and
nal terms-of-trade from their natural equilibrium path is clearly reduced (respectively
by 1:50% in average and 9:12%), which has welfare improving consequences. Since the
composition of the CPI ination rates and private consumption bundles becomes more
similar, for a given monetary policy rule, monetary policy becomes more e¤ective and
its ability to stabilize national PPI ination rates increases. These lower national PPI
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ination rates result in a lower pressure on nal terms-of-trade, which clearly reduces
their volatility.
However, while external adjustment relies less on the nal terms-of-trade, the volatility
of the current account is enhanced, which leads to welfare losses that more than com-
pensate the previous welfare gains. These losses are imputable to the increased distance
of hours and intermediate terms-of-trade to their natural level. The fact that agents
use the current account more intensively to adjust asymmetric shocks implies that la-
bor supplies and wages become less correlated and that the volatility of intermediate
terms-of-trade, based on relative wages, increases.
These e¤ects arise because debtor (resp. creditor) households need to improve (resp.
lower) their labor supply in order to increase (resp. decrease) their earnings and repay
their debts (resp. lower their savings) in the medium run. The intensity of this e¤ect
clearly depends on the level of costs levied by nancial intermediaries, that increases
the sensitivity of consumptions, labor e¤orts and equilibrium wages to variations of net
foreign assets or liabilities. A corollary to the increased volatility of relative labor e¤orts
and intermediate terms-of-trade is the increased volatility of relative consumptions.
Because the composition of consumptions becomes more similar, relative consumptions
should be less volatile. However, the consequences of the greater use of the current
account dampen this rst e¤ect, implying that relative consumptions gaps are more
volatile, which is also costly in terms of welfare.
Summing up, an increase in horizontal trade reduces the intensity of ine¢ ciencies
caused by nominal rigidities but magnies ine¢ ciencies related to the imperfect inte-
gration of nancial markets. For the baseline scenario, welfare losses are higher than
welfare gains.
Our results match those of other studies that quantitify the welfare gains associated to
the reduction of various distortions in the economy. Canzoneri et al. (2006) estimate
that the welfare costs of nominal inertia can reach 4% to 5%, mostly depending on the
degree of persistence in the economy. In our model, the value of the Frisch elasiticty
is low, the assumption of imperfect risk-sharing adds an important source of persis-
tence, and the estimated persistence of shocks is quite high. The overall persistence
is thus important and, consistently with Canzoneri et al. (2006), nominal inertia is
quite costly in terms of welfare in our model. Several studies also quantify the welfare
gains of nancial markets integration, building on higher risk-sharing and consumption
smoothing. For example, Van Wincoop (1999) nds that the welfare gains from risk-
sharing range from 1% to more than 7% of consumption. Those welfare gains could
actually be much higher according to previous studies using alternative methods to
measure nancial markets integration (see Lewis, 1996). More recently, Demyanyk and
Volosovych (2008) document that the welfare gains of nancial markets integration
range from 1% of permanent consumption for EMU members to more than 8% for
new European Union members. In our model, both sources of welfare losses (nominal
inertia and imperfect risk-sharing) are combined and to yield important welfare losses.
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As suggested by Dotsey and Ireland (1996), this combination of various frictions may
actually result in important welfare losses.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
We investigate the robustness of our results to a wide range of parameters variations.
The simulations have been run to evaluate the sensitivity of our results to the asymme-
try in the pattern of nominal rigidities. Since these simulations show that asymmetries
in the pattern of nominal rigidities do not play a signicant role in generating our
results, they are not reported but available.
Figure 3 reports the sensitivity of welfare gains or losses associated to a 10% increase
in horizontal trade to di¤erent variations in the set of structural parameters.
Fig. 3. Sensitivity of the welfare gains or losses of a 10% increase in horizontal trade
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Figure 3 one more time highlights the interaction between two e¤ects when horizontal
trade integration increases: (i) welfare gains related to the lower costs of nominal
rigidities and (ii) welfare losses caused by the increased volatility of the current account.
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Depending on parametrization, the overall welfare e¤ect of horizontal trade integration
is either positive or negative.
When portfolio management costs () fall under a certain threshold, between 0:09% and
0:1%, or when nominal rigidities are beyond 0:6, horizontal trade integration generates
welfare gains. This is the case either because the enhanced volatility of the current
account become less costly or because the reduction of national PPI ination rates
generates higher welfare gains. These results clearly show that frictions on nancial
markets are a key assumption to generate our results. This assumption introduces
welfare losses related to imperfect risk-sharing among members of the monetary union.
The sensitivity analysis reveals that small frictions ( = 0:09% implies that households
have to pay an average 0:36% annual interest rate premium to access nancial markets)
are su¢ cient to mitigate the welfare gains of lower ination rates when horizontal trade
increases. One shall also notice that the welfare gains of lower national ination rates
clearly surpass welfare losses when nominal rigidities parameters take standard values
of the literature (around 0:7-0:75).
The sensitivity of welfare gains/losses to variations of the elasticity of substitution be-
tween intermediate or nal goods also illustrates the mechanism behind welfare gains
or losses. As the elasticity of substitution between nal goods () increases, changes
in the volatility of nal terms-of-trade implied by an enhanced horizontal trade in-
tegration are lower. In the equilibrium, the volatility of PPI ination rates is thus
reduced, while the impact of  on the volatility of the current account is clearly pos-
itive (see the equation governing net foreign assets dynamics in Table A.1). Welfare
gains related to lower national ination rates are thus dampened, while welfare losses
caused by the increased volatility of the current account increase. As a consequence,
net welfare gains of horizontal trade integration depend negatively on the elasticity
of substitution between nal goods. On the contrary, as the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods () increases, intermediate terms-of-trade are less required
to uctuate to reach the equilibrium on intermediate goods markets, ceteris paribus. As
a consequence, the rise of the volatility of intermediate terms-of-trade, relative hours
and relative consumptions gaps are reduced when horizontal trade increases, which has
a positive impact on welfare gains.
Finally, the sensitivity of welfare gains to the inverse of the Frisch elasticity ( ) and
the risk-aversion parameter () is also investigated. When the intertemporal elasticity
of labor supply ( ) increases, the volatility of hours decreases in the equilibrium. Since
welfare losses related to nancial frictions depend on the response of labor supply as
documented in the previous subsection, lower responses of labor supplies imply lower
overall welfare losses or higher overall welfare gains when horizontal trade integration
increases. The e¤ect of the risk-aversion parameter is somehow surprising. The risk-
aversion parameter governs the willingness of households to smooth their consumption
over time when undergoing unexpected asymmetric shocks, which is associated with an
increased use of nancial markets, and should lead to higher welfare losses. However,
Figure 3 tells us that these aspects are more than compensated by the drop of the
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volatility of terms-of-trade and of national ination rates. Risk-aversion is thus found
to have a positive impact on the welfare gains generated by an increase in horizontal
trade integration.
Second, gure 4 reports the sensitivity of welfare gains or losses associated to a 10%
increase in vertical trade to di¤erent variations in the set of structural parameters.
Fig. 4. Sensitivity of the welfare gains or losses of a 10% increase in vertical trade
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Welfare gains generated by a 10% deeper vertical trade integration are clearly increasing
with the degree of nominal rigidities (), since the reduction of national ination rates
is both enhanced and more weighted in the loss function.
These gains are bearly sensitive to the level of portfolio management costs (), which
conrms that nancial markets do not play an important role when trade integration
is vertical.
The welfare gains of a deeper vertical trade integration also clearly decrease with the
degree of substitutability between goods. While the decrease is important when the
substitutability of nal goods () increases (from more than 15% of permanent con-
sumption when  = 1 to 10% when  = 15), welfare gains decline even more when
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the substitutability of intermediate goods () increases (from 14% of permanent con-
sumption when  = 1 to 0% when  = 15). In general, higher substitutability lowers
the required variations of terms-of-trade volatility when vertical trade increases. As
a consequence, as substitutability increases, changes in intermediate and nal terms-
of-trade volatility become very small when trade integration increases, which impacts
negatively on welfare gains. This e¤ect is much stronger for the substitutability be-
tween intermediate goods because nominal rigidities bear on nal goods prices while
intermediate goods prices are exible. When the substitutability between intermedi-
ate goods increases, the volatility of intermediate terms-of-trade gaps tend to become
una¤ected and the impact of vertical trade integration on welfare vanishes. Because
nal terms-of-trade are staggered, the welfare gains of vertical trade integration do not
completely fade away.
Finally, an increase of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor supply ( )
has a negative impact on the welfare gains of vertical trade integration for most plau-
sible values ( > 1). In the case of vertical trade integration, the volatility of the
current account decreases. The softening e¤ect of an increase of  on the volatility
of labor supplies thus a¤ects welfare gains in the opposite direction. Indeed, in the
equilibrium, higher values of  imply lower volatilities of hours worked, which slows
down the process of reduction of regional di¤erences in hours and lowers welfare gains
of vertical trade integration.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that horizontal and vertical trade integration have di¤erent outcomes
in terms of welfare in a monetary union characterized by business cycles asymmetries
and ination di¤erentials. In both cases, a deeper trade integration reduces ination
di¤erentials by favoring a better di¤usion of shocks from one country to an another,
through increased trade ows. This increased macroeconomic interdependence helps the
common monetary policy to be in line with national situations. Equilibrium national
ination rates decrease, and imply that trade integration thus generates welfare gains.
However, horizontal trade integration improves the volatility of the current account
while vertical trade integration reduces the overall need for external adjustment in case
of asymmetric shocks. As a consequence, horizontal trade integration implies welfare
losses that might exceed the previous welfare gains.
For the baseline estimation presented in this paper, horizontal trade integration pro-
duces welfare losses equivalent to an average 1.8% drop of permanent consumption and
vertical trade integration generates welfare gains that amount to an average 13.9% of
permanent consumption. However, an extensive sensitivity analysis indicates that the
relative importance of nancial markets frictions and nominal rigidities plays a key role
in the pattern of welfare gains or losses.
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The main conclusion of the paper is that nancial frictions, as well as their interactions
with real and nominal rigidities should carefully be taken into account when analyzing
business cycles asymmetries in open economies and/or monetary unions.
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APPENDIX
A Loglinear approximation of the model
Table A.1
A loglinear approximation of the model
Euler equations and labor supply
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B The welfare loss function
The welfare criterion writes
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We compute welfare derivations through a second order approximation of variables to
their steady state values and for second order expressions of shocks equal to zero, i.e.
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A second order approximation to UuC;t writes,
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Recalling that [ait]
2
= 0; a second order approximation of intermediate goods markets
gives,
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 ;
where t:i:p stands for terms that are independent of the problem, and,
dpit =

2
var (pi;t) ;
implying that [dpit]
2 2 O
3. Combining the last two expressions, we get,
nut +
1
2
[nut ]
2 +
1
2
[nrt ]
2 +
1
2
aht n
h
t +
1
2
aft n
f
t =
yut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[yrt ]
2 +
1
2
 (1  ) [t]2
+

4
var (ph;t) +

4
var (pf;t)
+ t:i:p+O
3 :
Combining with (B.1), we get,
UuN;t ' N1+ fyut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[yrt ]
2   1
2
aht n
h
t  
1
2
aft n
f
t
+
 (1  )
2
[t]
2 +

4
var (ph;t) +

4
var (pf;t)
+
 
2
[nut ]
2 +
 
2
[nrt ]
2g+ t:i:p+O
3 :
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Now turning to UuC;t; we compute a second order approximation to nal goods markets
conditions, while recalling that [git]
2
= 0,
yht +
1
2
h
yht
i2
= (1  ) (1  )

cht + st +
1
2
h
cht + st
i2
+  (1  )

cft + (1  ) st +
1
2
h
cft + (1  ) st
i2
+ t:i:p+O
3 ;
yft +
1
2
h
yft
i2
= (1  ) (1  )

cft   st +
1
2
h
cft   st
i2
+  (1  )

cht   (1  ) st +
1
2
h
cht   (1  ) st
i2
+ t:i:p+O
3 ;
which allows to deduce,
yut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[nrt ]
2 = (1  )

cut +
1
2
[cut ]
2 +
1
2
[crt ]
2

(1  ) (1  )
2
[st]
2 + t:i:p+O
3 ;
or,
cut +
1
2
[cut ]
2 +
1
2
[crt ]
2 =
1
(1  )

yut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[yrt ]
2

   (1  )
2
[st]
2 + t:i:p+O
3 ;
UuC;t becomes,
UuC;t ' C1 f
1
1  

yut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[yrt ]
2

  1
2
 (1  ) [st]2   
4
h
cht
i2   
4
h
cft
i2g
+ t:i:p+O
3 :
26
Collecting terms, we get,
Uut = U
u
C;t   UuN;t ' C1 f
1
1  

yut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[yrt ]
2

   (1  )
2
[st]
2   
2
[cut ]
2   
2
[crt ]
2g
 N1+ fyut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[yrt ]
2 +
 (1  )
2
[t]
2
+

4
var (ph;t) +

4
var (pf;t)  1
2
aht n
h
t  
1
2
aft n
f
t
+
 
2
[nut ]
2 +
 
2
[nrt ]
2g+ t:i:p+O
3 :
Using the fact that,
N1+ =
Y
A
N = Y C  =
C1 
(1  ) ;
we get,
Uut '
C1 
(1  )f 
(1  ) &
2
[st]
2   &
2
[t]
2 +
1
2
aht n
h
t +
1
2
aft n
f
t
   (1  )
2

[cut ]
2 + [crt ]
2

   
2

[nut ]
2 + [nrt ]
2

  
4
var (ph;t)  
4
var (pf;t)g+ t:i:p+O
3 ;
where & =  (1  )  0 and & =  (1  )  0: Recalling,
nut = y
u
t   aut ;
cut =
yut   gut
(1  ) ;
we get,
Uut '
C1 
(1  )f 
(1  ) &
2
[st]
2   &
2
[t]
2   
4
var (ph;t)  
4
var (pf;t)
  
2 (1  )
h
[yut ]
2   2yut gut
i
   (1  )
2
[crt ]
2
   
2
h
[yut ]
2   2yut aut
i
   
2
[nrt ]
2 +
1
2
aht n
h
t +
1
2
aft n
f
t g+ t:i:p+O
3 :
Recalling that,
eyut = (1  )( + 1) (1  ) +  aut +  (1  ) + gut ;
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the welfare simplies to,
Uut '
C1 
(1  )f 
(1  ) &
2
[st]
2   &
2
[t]
2   
4
var (ph;t)  
4
var (pf;t)
  +  (1  )
2 (1  ) [y
u
t   eyut ]2   yut aut + 12aht nht + 12aft nft
   (1  )
2
[crt ]
2    
2
[nrt ]
2g+ t:i:p+O
3 :
Simplifying cross products with,
1
2
aht n
h
t +
1
2
aft n
f
t = n
u
t a
u
t + n
r
ta
r
t
= yut a
u
t + n
r
ta
r
t + t:i:p
we get,
Uut '
C1 
(1  )f 
(1  ) &
2
[st]
2   &
2
[t]
2   
4
var (ph;t)  
4
var (pf;t)
  +  (1  )
2 (1  ) [y
u
t   eyut ]2 + nrtart    (1  )2 [crt ]2    2 [nrt ]2g
+ t:i:p+O
3 :
Using,
et = 2 (1  2)
$
grt  
2 (1 +  )
$
art ;
est = 2 (1  2)2
$
grt  
2 (1 +  ) (1  2)
$
art ;
ecrt = 2 (1 +  ) (1  2) (1  2)2$ art   2 (1  2)
2 (1  2)
2$
grt ;
enrt = 2

$ (1  2)2 + 2&

  1
$
art +
 (1  2)
$
grt
where $ = 1 + 2 

$ (1  2)2 + 2&

; and decomposing nrta
r
t ,
nrta
r
t =
(1 +  )
$
nrta
r
t  
  (1  2)
$
grtn
r
t
+ grt
 
$   (1 +  )
$
art +
  (1  2)
$
!
| {z }
 enrt
nrt :
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Using the expressions of nrt and y
r
t ;
nrta
r
t = (1  ) crt
 
(1  2) (1  2) (1 +  )
$
art  
  (1  2)2 (1  2)
$
grt
!
| {z }
ecrt
  (1  ) &st
 
2 (1 +  ) (1  2)
$
art  
2  (1  2)2
$
grt
!
| {z }
 est
  &t
 
2 (1 +  )
$
art  
2 (1  2)
$
grt
!
| {z }
 et
+  enrtnrt :
Simplifying,
nrta
r
t =  (1  ) ecrtcrt +  enrtnrt + & ett + (1  ) &estst;
and plugging into the welfare expression,
Uut '
C1 
(1  )f 
(1  ) &
2
[bst]2   &
2
[bt]2   
4
var (ph;t)  
4
var (pf;t)
  +  (1  )
2 (1  ) [byut ]2    (1  )2 [bcrt ]2    2 [bnrt ]2g
+ t:i:p+O
3 :
where bxt = xt   ext: Actualizing and summing among periods, we get,
!T =
Xs=T
s=t
s tEt fUus g :
Following Woodford (2003), we know that,
Xs=T
s=t
s tvar (pi;s) =
Ps=T
s=t 
s t
2
i;s
ki
;
where ki = (
1 i)(1 i)
i
which yields the nal form of the welfare function,
!T =   C
1 
2 (1  )
Xs=T
s=t
s tEtf(1  ) & [bst]2 + & [bt]2 + 
2'h
2h;t +

2'f
2f;t
+
+  (1  )
(1  ) [byut ]2 +  (1  ) [bcrt ]2 +  [bnrt ]2g+ t:i:p+O
3 :
where & =  (1  )  0, & =  (1  )  0, 'i = (1 
i)(1 i)
i
, and where t:i:p
gathers terms independent of the problem and O
3 terms of order 3 or higher.
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